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BIFURCATED JURY DELIBERATIONS IN
CRIMINAL RICO TRIALS
INTRODUCTION
Courts have been reluctant to tamper with the process by which crimi-
nal juries traditionally arrive at their verdicts.1 Ordinarily, the jurors
apply the law, as given to them by the judge, to the facts and return a
general verdict of guilty or not guilty, with no further explanation.2 On
rare occasions, the jury is instructed to answer special interrogatories
posed by the trial judge, which supplement its general verdict with docu-
mented findings of fact.3 In addition, the jury may be asked to make
findings of fact upon which the judge bases a verdict. This is called a
special verdict.4
In criminal trials, special verdicts5 and special interrogatories6 are gen-
erally disfavored because they might lead a jury that would otherwise
acquit to convict.7 Some courts, while acknowledging that special inter-
rogatories are disfavored, have nevertheless approved their use in crimi-
nal cases in certain situations.8
With the advent of complex and lengthy criminal trials such as those
brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act9
1. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 67 (1984); United States v. Spock, 416
F.2d 165, 181-82 (1st Cir. 1969).
2. See, e.g., Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1946); United States
v. Noble, 155 F.2d 315, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1946); Ingber v. Enzor, 664 F. Supp. 814, 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988).
3. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4. In criminal cases where forfeiture is an issue, a special verdict is required by Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(e). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(e); see, e.g., United States
v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 716 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3221 (1989);
United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 660 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1164
(1989); United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 340 (8th Cir. 1988).
5. See, e.g., Morris, 156 F.2d at 528.
6. See, e.g., United States v. Griffin, 705 F.2d 434, 437 (11th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969).
7. See Spock, 416 F.2d at 181-82; see also Note, Jury Agreement and the General
Verdict in Criminal Cases, 19 Land & Water L. Rev. 207, 222 (1984) (special interrogato-
ries force jury to be more logical and less humane).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 73 (2d Cir.) (permissible to deter-
mine who defendant managed or supervised in prosecution under continuing criminal
enterprise statute), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3164 (1989); United States v. Pforzheimer, 826
F.2d 200, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987) (information sought relevant to sentencing); United
States v. Buishas, 791 F.2d 1310, 1317 (7th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Ruggiero,
726 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d Cir.) (to determine which predicate acts underlie RICO convic-
tion), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Desmond 670 F.2d 414, 419 (3d
Cir. 1982) (used for each element of prosecution for tax evasion, although not recom-
mended); United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 203 (3d Cir. 1980) (to reduce juror
confusion and prejudice in RICO case), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981). But see United
States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 420-21 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (use of
special interrogatories in criminal cases has gone too far; should only be used when de-
fendant specifically requests them with good cause).
9. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982
& Supp. V 1987)).
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("RICO"), "[s]ome courts have questioned whether the mammoth pro-
portions of these trials are beyond the capability of trial judges and ordi-
nary jurors."10 The most startling example of this attitude recently
appeared in United States v. Coonan,II in which the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit suggested a novel plan for structuring criminal RICO
jury deliberations.12 The plan called for special interrogatories and bifur-
cation of the jury charge and deliberations.I3
A criminal jury usually knows how its findings will affect its determi-
nation of guilt or innocence.' 4 The procedure proposed in Coonan repre-
sents a break with that tradition. 5 As a result, the plan raises
fundamental questions about the power of a judge to modify traditional
procedures, the function of the jury in a criminal trial, and the extent of
the prosecution's rights in connection with trial by jury.
Part I of this Note illustrates the great risk in some criminal RICO
trials that the jury will convict a defendant even if the jurors have reason-
able doubts about some elements of the crime. Part I then explains the
Second Circuit's plan to alleviate that risk. Part II discusses the power of
the trial judge to modify procedure, and Part III describes the impact of
the proposed procedure on the function of the criminal jury. This Note
concludes that in some criminal RICO cases, where there is a great dan-
ger that the jury will seek to convict a RICO defendant on impermissible
grounds, the trial judge should require the jury to answer special inter-
rogatories about the predicate acts. This should be done before the ju-
rors are informed that two such acts are needed to constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity and before they render a general verdict on the
RICO count.
10. Giuliani, Legal Remedies for Attacking Organized Crime, in Major Issues in Or-
ganized Crime Control: Symposium Proceedings, 103, 113 (1986); see also United States
v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 749-50, 754-56 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (discussing effects of RICO
cases on jury, defendant and judge).
11. 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988).
12. See id. at 889-90.
13. See id. The plan originally proposed by the district court judge called for a spe-
cial verdict. See id. at 888. The district court's proposal was based on the then prevailing
view in the Second Circuit that two predicate acts were sufficient, without more, to form
a pattern of racketeering activity. See id. at 889 n.3. Thus, the district court judge's
proposal would have removed no factfinding from the jury and the judge could merely
add up the predicate acts found by the jury to determine if a pattern was present. See id.
The Second Circuit, however, recently changed its position on this issue. Now two acts
are not sufficient to form a pattern. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1381
(2d Cir. 1989) (en bane). Therefore, to find a pattern the judge could not simply add up
the number of predicate acts committed. He would also have to consider the require-
ments of relatedness and continuity. Because the district court's proposal is problematic,
this Note focuses on the procedure suggested by the majority in the court of appeals.
14. See Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1946); see also United
States v. Johnson, 469 F.2d 973, 976 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972) (trier of fact not required to look
at evidence in isolation or vacuum).
15. See infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 57
BIFUR CA TED JURY DELIBERATIONS
I. RICO AND THE COONAN PROCEDURE
RICO has proven an effective tool for combatting organized criminal
activity because it allows the prosecutor to present the jury with a com-
plete picture of how an organized criminal enterprise operates. Criminal
acts which might otherwise have to be prosecuted separately can be
proved as part of the single crime of racketeering. 16
The main weapon in this fight has been 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) which
makes it a crime to conduct or participate in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity.'" To establish a pattern of
racketeering activity, the prosecution must prove at least two predicate
acts of racketeering.' RICO can be used to attack the infiltration of
legitimate enterprises by racketeers,' 9 or illegitimate enterprises that exist
solely to carry out the criminal activities of racketeers. E°
RICO, however, raises some issues that must be addressed to ensure
that the statute is fairly applied.2' For example, indictments brought
under RICO require proof of a great deal of criminal activity22 and cre-
16. As one noted prosecutor has observed:
[RICO] is the only criminal statute that enables the Government to present a
jury with the whole picture of how an enterprise, such as an organized crime
family, operates.... Instead of merely proving one criminal act in a defend-
ant's life, it permits proof of a defendant's whole life in crime.
Giuliani, supra note 10, at 106; see also Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal
(pts. III & IV), 87 Colum. L. Rev. 920, 940-41 (1987).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
Id.
In addition, section 1962(d), which makes it a crime to conspire to violate RICO, has
been an important weapon in the fight against organized crime. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(1982).
18. See id. § 1961(5). The predicate acts of racketeering that will support a RICO
conviction are listed in section 1961(1). See id. § 1961(1) (Supp. V 1987).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 563 (2d Cir. 1988) (municipal
agency as enterprise), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637 (1989); United States v. Feldman, 853
F.2d 648, 655 (9th Cir. 1988) (corporation as enterprise), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1164
(1989).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir.) (commission of "La
Cosa Nostra" as enterprise), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3192 (1989); United States v. Castel-
lano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1392 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (group united for purpose of racketeering
activity as enterprise). The Supreme Court approved the use of RICO to attack wholly
illegitimate enterprises in United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
21. These issues are discussed extensively in a recent article by Professor Lynch that
is the most comprehensive discussion of the RICO statute. See Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal (pts. I-IV), 87 Colum. L. Rev. 661, 920 (1987). The case that
offered the solution discussed in this Note was rendered after the publication of Professor
Lynch's article and is, therefore, not discussed in it.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1989) (11 de-
fendants charged in indictment requiring more than 160 determinations of guilt or inno-
cence); United States v. Boylan, 698 F. Supp. 376, 377 (D. Mass. 1988) (7 defendants
1989]
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ate the danger of prejudicial spillover of evidence.2" This danger may be
exacerbated where the alleged enterprise is illegitimate, rather than legiti-
mate,24 because the prosecution may present evidence of other bad acts
which are not charged in the indictment to prove the enterprise
element.
25
Evidence from RICO counts can also affect determination of non-
RICO counts. In some instances, the possibility of prejudicial spillover is
so great that convictions on other non-RICO counts must be reversed
when an unproven RICO count is submitted to the jury.26
In addition to prejudicial spillover of evidence, there is also the danger
that the jurors will convict simply to punish a defendant even if the pros-
ecution has not proved every element of RICO beyond a reasonable
doubt.27 This concern is greatest when the defendant is charged only
charged in 57 count indictment); United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1378-79
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (24 defendants charged with violating RICO through a pattern of 80
acts of racketeering; 76 other counts in indictment).
23. The policy behind evidentiary rules that generally prohibits the use of evidence of
other crimes to prove propensity to commit charged crimes, see Fed. R. Evid. 404(b);
Fed. R. Evid. 609, is challenged in a RICO case. See Lynch, supra note 16, at 961.
Some appellate courts dismiss claims of prejudicial spillover in RICO cases when one
or more defendants are acquitted on one or more counts, reasoning that this is evidence
that the jury was able to distinguish among defendants and counts. See, e.g., United
States v. Friedman, 854 F.2d 535, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1637
(1989); United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1477 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
474 U.S. 1101 (1986); see also Lynch, supra note 16, at 966 (danger of prejudicial spil-
lover may be exaggerated).
This proves, however, only that the defendant who was acquitted was not prejudiced.
There may be different amounts of evidence presented to the jury concerning different
defendants and different counts. Some defendants may, arguably, benefit from joinder
because they appear relatively blameless compared to their co-defendants. See Lynch,
supra note 16, at 966 n.189. However, those defendants in whose cases the evidence is
close might be prejudiced because the jury may be more likely to use its own sense of
justice and equity. See V. Hans & N. Vidmar, Judging the Jury 154 (1986). Therefore,
prejudice and other extra legal factors may play a greater role in cases when the outcome
is more doubtful. See United States v. Wasson, 568 F.2d 1214, 1223 (5th Cir. 1978) (once
some jury confusion was shown, "[a]lthough the evidence was sufficient to support the
verdict on the substantive count, it was not so overwhelming that the obvious guilt of
[one defendant] did not tip the scales against [another defendant]").
24. See United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 855 n.10 (8th Cir. 1987); see also
Lynch, supra note 16, at 961.
25. See United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 949 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
937 (1986).
26. See United States v. Guiliano, 644 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v.
Sam Goody, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 1223, 1225-26 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dismissed, 675
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1982).
Courts have adopted different tests to determine when prejudicial spillover requires
reversal in such a case. Compare United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248, 256 (6th Cir.)
(defendant must show jury unable to separate and distinguish evidence relevant to differ-
ent counts or defendants), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 307 (1988) with United States v. Stefan,
784 F.2d 1093, 1101 (11th Cir.) ("(1) [w]hether the jury meticulously sifted the evidence;
and (2) whether the appellant was prejudiced by a spill over of evidence relating to other
counts or defendants"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855 (1986).
27. See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text. This is of particular concern in
RICO cases because the prosecutor must necessarily present evidence of multiple acts
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with a RICO count. If the prosecution has presented strong proof as to
one particularly heinous predicate act, but its proof as to other predicate
acts is weak, the jury may "find" another predicate act rather than allow
the defendant to go unpunished.2"
Recognizing this problem posed by RICO cases, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit recently approved a unique method of instructing
the jury, designed to ensure that the jury actually believes the defendant
committed at least two predicate acts before convicting him under
RICO. In United States v. Coonan,29 eight defendants were charged with
violating RICO through a pattern of thirty-two predicate acts.3" The
district court judge feared that, if the jurors believed that one predicate
act was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and he informed the jurors
that at least two were necessary to form a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, they might find a second predicate act to ensure punishment.31
The judge proposed that the jury return a special verdict. Unaware
that at least two predicate acts were necessary to constitute a pattern of
racketeering activity, the jurors would only determine which predicate
acts, if any, each defendant committed. In addition, the jurors would
determine whether the other elements of RICO were proved. The judge
would then determine the defendant's guilt based on the jury's findings.
The judge reasoned that this procedure would make the jury focus on
each predicate act and determine whether it had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt.32 The prosecution appealed for a writ of mandamus to
prevent the district court judge from using this procedure. The appellate
court rendered its decision on the same day it heard oral argument.33
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit approved this proce-
which would themselves constitute crimes outside the RICO context. See supra notes 17-
23 and accompanying text.
28. The predicate acts of racketeering can range from violent crimes such as murder
and kidnapping to white collar crimes such as mail or wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961(1) (Supp. V 1987). In addition to presenting evidence of the predicate acts, the
prosecutor may present evidence of other bad acts not charged in the indictment in order
to prove the existence of an illegitimate enterprise. See Ellison, 793 F.2d at 949. Proof
beyond a reasonable doubt as to any one of these acts may make a jury prone to convict.
See United States v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 544 (2d Cir.) (Bright, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("because the defendants may have been shown to belong to the [enter-
prise] does not justify putting them in jail for one hundred years on evidence that does
not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3192 (1989).
29. 839 F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988).
30. See id. at 887.
31. See id. at 889. In explaining his plan, the district court judge stated:
If one [predicate] act is clear and [the jury is] kind of fuzzy on the other, in that
situation the jury should find the fuzzy one not proven.
If the jury is told that finding that fuzzy one not proven will release that
defendant, they may go back and think it over, which I don't think they should.
Brief for the United States of America at 8, United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886 (2d
Cir. 1988) (No. 88-3007).
32. See Coonan, 839 F.2d at 888. The judge also gave the defendants veto power over
this procedure because he had designed it for their benefit. See id.
33. See id. at 887.
1989]
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dure34 and proposed an alternative.35 The majority of the panel36 sug-
gested that the jury deliberate in two phases. In the first phase, the jury
would answer interrogatories about the predicate acts without being told
that two such acts were needed to constitute a pattern of racketeering
activity. If the jury found that a defendant committed at least two predi-
cate acts, the judge would then instruct the jury on the pattern require-
ment and instruct the jury to return a general verdict on the RICO
counts.3 7 The trial judge used this procedure and seven of eight defend-
ants were convicted of violating RICO.3"
This procedure is unique in criminal trials. Normally, bifurcation of
criminal trials involves the introduction of separate evidence. For exam-
ple, jury deliberations have been bifurcated in criminal trials to separate
the guilt determination from the sentencing determination in capital
punishment cases,39 to determine an insanity defense independently," to
separate a forfeiture proceeding from the guilt determination so that a
defendant may testify on the former without implicating his fifth amend-
ment right against self-incrimination,41 and to meet the requirements of
statutes that require proof of previous crimes.4"
The Coonan procedure, however, does not separate the presentation of
34. See id. at 891-92.
35. See id. at 889-90.
36. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Altimari dealt mostly with the trial judge's pro-
posed procedure. He thought that the majority improperly suggested a procedure during
oral argument and the court should confine its decision to the issues briefed by the par-
ties. See id. at 892 (Altimari, J., dissenting). Judge Altimari remarked on the majority's
suggestion only briefly. See id. at 899-900.
37. See id. at 889-90.
38. See 42 Crim. L. Rep. 1082 (BNA) (Mar. 2, 1988).
39. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190-92 (1976).
40. See, e.g., United States v. Greene, 834 F.2d 1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 2908 (1988); see also Schwartz, Should Juries Be Informed of the Con-
sequences of the Insanity Verdictl 8 J. Psychiatry & L. 167, 178 n.4 (1980) (some states
bifurcate trials when insanity is raised as a defense).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Feldman, 853 F.2d 648, 661-62 (9th Cir. 1988) (trial
courts should bifurcate forfeiture proceedings from guilt phase of RICO cases), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1164 (1989); United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 874 (3d Cir. 1987).
42. See, e.g., United States v. Vastola, 670 F. Supp. 1244, 1263 (D.N.J. 1987) (statutes
prohibiting possession of firearms by felon bifurcated from other charges); see also Com-
ment, State v. Green Recidivist Statutes: The Procedure for the Introduction of Prior
Crime Evidence, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 960, 965 n.32 (1987) (nine states now bifurcate jury
proceedings in connection with habitual offender statutes). But see United States v. Col-
lamore, 868 F.2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1989) (improper to bifurcate elements of crime of
possession of weapon by felon so jury does not hear criminal record in first stage).
A few courts have bifurcated deliberations in multi-defendant cases so that evidence
against one defendant is presented to the jury only after they have rendered a verdict on
the other defendant. See United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385, 1387 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974). This procedure was criticized by the circuit court, but not
reversed because the jury acquitted the defendant on which they deliberated first. See id.
at 1388. But see United States v. McIver, 688 F.2d 726, 729 (11th Cir. 1982) (bifurcated
trial in which same jury that convicted codefendants heard case against defendant vio-
lates right to fair and impartial jury and requires reversal); United States v. Stratton, 649
F.2d 1066, 1081-82 (5th Cir. 1981) (same in RICO trial).
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evidence into different stages; all the evidence is presented before the jury
deliberates. Only the jury charge and deliberations are bifurcated.4 3
II. POWER OF TRIAL JUDGE TO MODIFY PROCEDURE
The jury traditionally receives the law from the court through instruc-
tions, which the jury is expected to follow.' Although no provision in
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically gives a judge the
power to bifurcate instructions or jury deliberations, Rule 57 provides, in
part, that "[i]n all cases not provided for by rule, the district judges...
may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with these
rules or those of the district in which they act."45
The use of special interrogatories in Coonan differs from their use in
other criminal contexts. In other situations, the jury either knows the
consequences of its answers to the interrogatories or is supplying infor-
mation necessary for sentencing.46 In the Coonan procedure, however,
the jury does not know the consequences of its answers to the special
interrogatories. Nevertheless, the use of special interrogatories in these
other contexts in criminal RICO cases illustrates how courts have
adopted procedures which they believe enhance the jury deliberation
process.
47
43. The Coonan procedure provides only limited protection for the defendant. It will
protect the defendant from the jury finding two predicate acts to ensure punishment, but
will not protect the defendant from the jury finding any other element of RICO for the
same purpose.
44. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 66 (1984); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 193 (1976). For a suggestion for RICO jury instructions, see Jury Instructions for
Civil and Criminal RICO Cases with Commentary, 1987 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 1 (approved by
RICO Cases Comm., Criminal Justice Section of the A.B.A.).
The Supreme Court has recognized that "there are some contexts in which the risk that
the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of fail-
ure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored." Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968); accord Krule-
witch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). In Bruton, the
Court held that the effect of one defendant's confession, which implicated his codefendant
and was inadmissible against his codefendant, could not be remedied by limiting instruc-
tions from the judge. See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137.
45. Fed. R. Crim. P. 57.
46. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
47. The use of other innovative procedures which are not specifically provided for in
the rules of procedure or in statutes, such as note taking by the jury, see United States v.
Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 157-58 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 918 (1979); United
States v. Maclean, 578 F.2d 64, 65 (3d Cir. 1978), and multiple juries, see United States v.
Lewis, 716 F.2d 16, 19 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 987 (1983); United States v.
Hayes, 676 F.2d 1359, 1366 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982); United States
v. Rimar, 558 F.2d 1271, 1273 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978); see also
United States v. Crane, 499 F.2d 1385, 1388 (6th Cir.) (one jury deliberated in two phases
so that evidence admissible against one defendant would not be used against codefend-
ant), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974), have been left to the discretion of the trial judge.
Bifurcated juries have also been left to the trial court's discretion. See Holmes v. United
States, 363 F.2d 281, 283 (D.C. Cir. 1966); see also United States v. Greene, 834 F.2d
1067, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (issue of insanity bifurcated), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2908
(1988); United States v. Vastola, 670 F. Supp. 1244, 1263 (D.N.J. 1987) (possession of
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Despite the lack of any explicit authorization for the use of special
interrogatories in criminal cases, a" and the fact that they are generally
disfavored,49 some courts have approved their use in criminal RICO tri-
als to supplement the jury's general verdict.50 This use has been justified
on the basis of their perceived benefits to the trial process.
One such benefit arises at the appellate level. Special interrogatories
inform the appellate court of the precise basis for a RICO conviction. 1
When a RICO jury returns a general verdict of guilty and one of the
predicate acts submitted to the jury is later found to be legally insufficient
by a reviewing court, the conviction must be overturned because it is
impossible to determine whether two legally sufficient predicate acts sup-
weapon by felon bifurcated from other charges). But see United States v. Collamore, 868
F.2d 24, 27-28 (1st Cir. 1989) (bifurcation of elements of possession of firearm by felon
improper); United States v. Brewer, 841 F.2d 667, 674 (6th Cir.) (Krupansky, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (bifurcation proper only when provided for by legisla-
ture), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 375 (1988).
48. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 926 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., concur-
ring in part, dissenting in part) (relying, in part, on Fed. R. Crim. P. 57(b), the precursor
to Fed. R. Crim. P. 57, to justify the use of special interrogatories in criminal trials), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
49. See supra notes 6-7. On the other hand, when a criminal case is tried to a judge,
the judge must explain the factual findings upon which the verdict was based, if re-
quested. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(c). These conclusions must be explicit enough to en-
able an appellate court to review the decision. See United States v. Silberman, 464 F.
Supp. 866, 869 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
50. See, eg., United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 269 (1988); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v. Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 202-03 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981).
51. If all the predicate acts were always charged as separate counts in the indictment,
then general verdicts on the predicate acts would serve the same function as special inter-
rogatories because general verdicts would indicate which predicate acts supported the
RICO conviction. See Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 109 S. Ct. 1750 (1989); United States v. Bailey, 859 F.2d 1265, 1278 n.4 (7th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 796 (1989); United States v. Lopez, 803 F.2d 969, 976 (9th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1030 (1987). But see United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d
659, 669 (3d Cir. 1978) (RICO conviction reversed because no way to determine whether
jury relied on two valid substantive counts as predicate acts to find pattern of racketeer-
ing), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909 (1979).
In a dissent from a denial of certiorari, Justice White maintained that a conflict among
the circuits on this issue existed that required resolution. See McCulloch v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 337 (1987) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). But see
United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1350-51 (7th Cir.) (no conflict among circuits if
court finds jury would have been acting irrationally not to convict on RICO given convic-
tions on predicate offenses), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2022 (1988).
As a practical matter, the predicate acts are not always charged as separate counts in
the indictment. Crimes which cannot be charged as a substantive count in a federal in-
dictment, such as state crimes, see United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418-19 (7th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2022 (1988); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (Supp. V 1987),
crimes for which the statute of limitations has run, see United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d
632, 663 n.55 (11th Cir. 1984); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982), and charges for which the
defendant has already been tried and acquitted, see United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656,
670 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 991 (1986); United States v. Hampton, 786 F.2d 977,
980 (10th Cir. 1986), can all serve as predicate acts in a RICO indictment.
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port the RICO conviction. 2 If the jury reveals the predicate acts upon
which the RICO conviction is based through special interrogatories, the
court would not have to overturn the conviction if two sufficient predi-
cate acts remained.5
3
The use of special interrogatories in criminal RICO cases can also alert
a reviewing court to possible jury errors. Special interrogatories may dis-
close that a jury has mistakenly convicted a defendant after finding only
one predicate act.54 This procedure can also ensure that the jury agrees
unanimously on the same two predicate acts,55 and that the jury did not
use as predicate acts other counts which were not charged as such in the
indictment. 6
The use of special interrogatories in criminal RICO cases may also
benefit the defendant 57 by reducing jury confusion and by forcing the
jury to consider each defendant and each predicate act individually. This
reduces the risk of prejudicial spillover of evidence.5
When interrogatories are used for the purpose of appellate review, the
52. See, e.g., United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 108
S. Ct. 2022 (1988); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 861 (8th Cir. 1987).
53. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 922-23 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 831 (1984). The practice of using special interrogatories in criminal RICO cases for
the purpose of appellate review has been encouraged. See Note, supra note 7, at 222;
Note, RICO and the Predicate Offenses: An Analysis of Double Jeopardy and Verdict
Consistency Problems, 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 382, 407-08 (1982). It has also been criti-
cized as an unnecessary intrusion into the role of the jury. See Obermaier, Juries and
Their Verdicts, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 4, 1984, at 2, col. 1.
In complex civil cases, the use of special verdicts and special interrogatories is en-
couraged in order to avoid relitigation. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263, 279 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). Unlike criminal
cases, however, special verdicts and special interrogatories are specifically provided for in
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(a) and (b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(a)-(b). Further-
more, the objectives of civil and criminal cases are different. See, e.g., Sparf & Hansen v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51, 174-75 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting) (verdict in criminal cases
is a judgment of guilt or innocence of defendant and is not meant to establish rules for
future like verdicts in civil cases); Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 167 F.2d 54, 70 (2d
Cir.) (Hand, J., concurring) (favoring greater use of interrogatories in civil but not crimi-
nal trials), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 816 (1948).
54. See Biaggi Convicted of Racketeering in Wedtech Case, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1988,
at 42, col. 2 (conviction of Richard Biaggi on RICO count overturned by judge because
jury only found one predicate act). The court would not be able to ascertain this if only a
general verdict were returned and if the predicate acts were not all charged in the indict-
ment. Such inconsistent verdicts, however, do not require automatic reversal. See
United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57 (1984); cases cited infra note 128.
55. Cf. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1344 (5th Cir. 1983) (in RICO case
judge should instruct jury that they must be unanimous on the predicate acts but failure
to do so is not plain error), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Davis, 673
F. Supp. 252, 258 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (verdict form will ensure that jury is unanimous as to
predicate acts).
56. See Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1344.
57. See United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 927 n.3 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); United States v.
Palmeri, 630 F.2d 192, 202-03 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 967 (1981).
58. See United States v. Desmond, 670 F.2d 414, 418 (3d Cir. 1982); Palmeri, 630
F.2d at 202.
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jury can be instructed to answer the interrogatories only after they vote
to convict, thereby alleviating the concern that this procedure would lead
an otherwise merciful jury to convict. 9 When special interrogatories are
used as a means of structuring the jury's deliberations, as in Coonan, the
jury must answer the interrogatories before a general verdict is returned.
The ultimate decision whether to use special interrogatories in criminal
RICO cases is left to the discretion of the trial judge in those courts
which permit their use.6" Neither the prosecutor6 nor the defendant 62
has the right to insist on their use.
Clearly, however, there must be some limits on the trial judge's discre-
tion. The trial judge has no power to adopt procedures that violate the
Constitution or are prohibited by statute. The sixth amendment guaran-
tees the defendant a trial by jury.63 However, the prosecution, "as a liti-
gant, has a legitimate interest in seeing that cases in which it believes a
conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the Constitu-
tion regards as most likely to produce a fair result."'  Thus, although
the defendant can demand a jury trial, a waiver of that right requires the
consent of the prosecutor.65
The right to trial by jury consists of at least those essential elements
associated with jury trial at the time of the adoption of the sixth amend-
ment.66 A waiver of any of these elements constitutes a waiver of the
59. See Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 928 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
60. See Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 928 (Newman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part); see also Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 114 (2d Cir.) (general verdict
returned although special interrogatories available), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1750 (1989);
United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 227-28 (3d Cir.) (trial court rejected prosecu-
tion request for use of interrogatories because defendant objected), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
849 (1983).
61. See Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 227-28.
62. See United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1251 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 909 (1979); United States v. Munz, 542 F.2d 1382, 1388-89 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Jackson, 542 F.2d 403, 412 (7th Cir.
1976).
63. See U.S. Const. amend. VI.
64. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). However, a "jury trial [is] princi-
pally for the benefit of the accused." Id. at 33 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 312 (1930)).
65. Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(a) provides: "[c]ases required to be tried by jury shall be so
tried unless the defendant waives a jury trial in writing with the approval of the court and
the consent of the government." Id. In Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965), the
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this rule. See id. at 36; see also United
States v. Sun Myung Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (2d Cir. 1983) (jury trial because
prosecution would not consent to waiver), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971 (1984).
66. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 288 (1930). The essential elements of
trial by jury as defined by the Patton court were:
(1) that the jury should consist of twelve men, neither more nor less; (2) that the
trial should be in the presence and under the superintendence of a judge having
power to instruct them as to the law and advise them in respect of the facts; and
(3) that the verdict should be unanimous.
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right to trial by jury.67 Therefore, any change in procedure that would
constitute a waiver of trial by jury must be conditioned on the prosecu-
tion's consent under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a).
The Coonan procedure, however, does not constitute such a waiver. 6s
The jury is instructed on all the essential elements of RICO as the sixth
amendment requires.69 Moreover, the jury and not the judge determines
the existence of the elements of a RICO violation.7" The procedure as
proposed by the majority in Coonan will not reduce the jury "to the posi-
tion of a mere ministerial agent."71 The procedure merely adds a prelim-
inary step to the process and ensures that the jury has found the, pattern
of racketeering activity element proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
The trial judge also may not adopt any procedure which is inconsistent
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.72 Bifurcation of issues is
specifically provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.7 3 There
is no such provision in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.74 Some
courts have suggested that judges should not adopt procedures in crimi-
nal trials which are specifically provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and as to which the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are
silent.75 Presumably this is an indication that such rules were considered
and rejected in a criminal context. Other courts have held that this cir-
cumstance does not preclude the use of such procedures in criminal tri-
als.76 The latter view seems more consistent with the spirit of the rules,
67. See id. at 290.
68. Some district courts have held that there are some instances where the prosecu-
tion's interest will not override a defendant's waiver of trial by jury. See United States v.
Lewis, 638 F. Supp. 573, 578-80 (W.D. Mich. 1986); United States v. Braunstein, 474 F.
Supp. 1, 12-14 (D.N.J. 1979); United States v. Panteleakis, 422 F. Supp. 247, 248-50
(D.R.I. 1976); United States v. Schipani, 44 F.R.D. 461, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The
Supreme Court explicitly left this issue open. See Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 37
(1965).
69. See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Hatrak, 417 F. Supp. 316, 319 (D.N.J. 1976),
aff'd, 564 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 906 (1978); see also Morris v.
United States, 156 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1946) (instructions should not leave jury igno-
rant of what constitutes crime charged).
70. It is an impermissible invasion of the jury's function for the judge to determine
the existence of elements of a crime. See Morris, 156 F.2d at 529-31; see also United
States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 1131, 1134 (2d Cir. 1974) (prosecution must prove elements
of crime to jury not judge); Glenn v. United States, 420 F.2d 1323, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(jury not judge must determine offense committed by defendant).
71. Morris, 156 F.2d at 529. The proposal of the trial judge is more troublesome in
this respect. Under that proposal, the jury would never be instructed on the pattern of
racketeering element of RICO. Allowing the judge to extrapolate from findings made by
the jury might deny the jury their historic province of applying the law to the facts. See
id.
72. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 57.
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b).
74. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 deals with the timing of instructions to
the jury. The judge may instruct the jury before or after closing arguments or at both
times. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30.
75. See United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 1989); United States v.
Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 180 (1st Cir. 1969).
76. Cf United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 925-26 (2d Cir.) (Newman, J., con-
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which are to be construed liberally77 and "were not intended to be, a
rigid code [having] an inflexible meaning irrespective of the circum-
stances."7 The Coonan procedure does not contravene the letter or
spirit of any Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure. Indeed, trial judges
are given discretion over other aspects of the procedure by which instruc-
tions are submitted to the jury.7
The Coonan procedure is within the trial judge's discretion because it
does not violate the Constitution nor does it contravene the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Nevertheless, the effect of the procedure
on the function of the criminal jury must be assessed to determine
whether use of the procedure would be a wise exercise of the trial judge's
discretion in any particular case.
III. IMPACT OF THE COONAN PROCEDURE ON THE FUNCTION OF
THE CRIMINAL JURY
The judge instructs the jury on the law and the jury applies it to the
facts to decide whether a defendant violated the law.8 0 In making this
determination the criminal jury acts as the "conscience of the commu-
nity."81 Changes in traditional procedure, therefore, should not be un-
dertaken lightly by the trial judge.8 2
A. Defendant's Perspective
The criminal jury is heralded as a guarantor against oppression by the
government.83 An intrusion on its function by a representative of the
government, such as a judge, is looked upon with disfavor.84 The general
verdict is perceived as an important safeguard in this respect. As one
court remarked, "[i]t is one of the most essential features of the right of
trial by jury that no jury should be compelled to find any but a general
curring in part, dissenting in part) (fact that special interrogatories specifically provided
for in civil rules but not provided for in criminal rules does not prohibit use in criminal
cases), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
77. See United States v. Claus, 5 F.R.D. 278, 280 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).
78. Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 142 (1964); accord Berman v. United States,
378 U.S. 530, 538 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting); United States v. Mendoza, 565 F.2d
1285, 1289 (5th Cir. 1978). "Theo rules are intended to provide for the just determina-
tion of every criminal proceeding. They [should] be construed to secure simplicity in
procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay." Fed. R. Crim. P. 2.
79. See United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 84 (1st Cir. 1981).
80. See Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 528-29 (9th Cir. 1946).
81. United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182 (1st Cir. 1969); accord United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (jury "spokesman for the community conscience").
82. See Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312-13 (1930); Morris v. United States,
156 F.2d 525, 529 (9th Cir. 1946).
83. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 155 (1968); Spock, 416 F.2d at 181.
84. See United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977);
Spock, 416 F.2d at 181; United States v. Ogull, 149 F. Supp. 272, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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verdict in criminal cases, and the removal of this safeguard would violate
its design and destroy its spirit.",
8 1
In the early history of the United States, the jury had the right to
return a general verdict that defied the law.86 This concept, known as
jury nullification, refers to the notion that the jurors may ignore the law
as given to them by the court and decide a case based on their own sense
of justice. Courts began to deny the jury this right87 when the distrust of
judges as potential tools of government tyranny declined 8 and judges
began to fear that juries would use their power to treat criminal defend-
ants harshly. 89 Finally, in 1895, the Supreme Court settled the issue and
affirmed a judge's instruction that " 'a jury is expected to be governed by
law, and the law it should receive from the court,' "90 citing the need for
uniformity in the law.91 Nevertheless, courts continue to acknowledge
the power, but not the right, of the jury to return a verdict "in the teeth
of both law and facts."
92
85. Spock, 416 F.2d at 181 (quoting G. Clementson, Special Verdicts and Special
Findings by Juries 49 (1905)). The policy favoring the general verdict in criminal cases is
usually associated with the jury showing mercy to the defendant. Thus, the jury "tem-
per[s] [the law's] rigor by the mollifying influence of current ethical conventions."
United States ex rel. McCann v. Adams, 126 F.2d 774, 776 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 317 U.S. 269 (1942); accord United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 419 (5th
Cir. 1974) ("[a] general verdict insures the input of compassion into a jury's decisional
process").
86. See Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19, 32 (1795) (jury not bound to return
verdict which conforms to court's instructions on law); Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 1, 4 n.2 (1794) ("[i]n a criminal case, the jury have not only the power, but the
right, to determine the law as well as the facts, by a verdict of 'not guilty'" (emphasis in
original)). This notion was partially a function of the colonists' experience with British
laws and judges. Colonial juries often defied Parliament by not enforcing the Navigation
Act, and a colonial jury refused to convict John Peter Zenger for publishing material not
authorized by the British Mayor. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Con-
tours of a Controversy, 43 Law & Contemp. Probs. 51, 57 (Autumn 1980); Scheflin, Jury
Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 So. Cal. L. Rev. 168, 173-74 (1972). There may
have been a practical aspect to this development as well. Many of the judges at the time
were not professionals. Thus, they had no greater training in the law than a jury. See
Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 582, 591 (1939).
87. See United States v. Morris, 26 F. Cas. 1323, 1331-36 (C.C.D. Mass. 1851) (No.
15,815); United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042, 1043 (C.C.D. Mass. 1835) (No.
14,545).
88. See United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
89. See Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 86, at 59.
90. Sparf & Hansen v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 62 n.1 (1895) (emphasis omitted).
91. See id. at 101.
92. Homing v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920); accord United States
v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Avery, 717 F.2d 1020, 1027
(6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 905 (1984). When the jury exercises this power in
favor of a criminal defendant by returning a general verdict of not guilty, the verdict is
not reviewable. See Harris v. Rivera, 454 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1981); United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1132 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
There are still instances when criminal juries use their power of nullification in favor of
a criminal defendant. Juries may have a more generous view of self defense than the law
provides. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 221-41 (1966). The jury may
inject a notion of contributory fault of the victim into the criminal law. See id. at 242-57.
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In Indiana93 and Maryland,94 the power of the jury to decide the law is
guaranteed by the state constitution. Even in these states, the jury may
not use its power to create a crime simply to punish a defendant.9 Simi-
larly, some judges96 and commentators 97 express the view that the jury
should be able to use its nullification power only when it is inclined to be
merciful. Under this view, the jury should be told that it has the right to
acquit if it believes that under certain circumstances the law should not
be applied to a particular defendant. Courts can protect against the jury
using its nullification power to create crimes through appellate review, 98
directed verdicts, 99 judgments notwithstanding the verdict"° and orders
The jury might be less likely to convict when the harm done by the defendant is minimal.
See id. at 258-85. Finally, the jury may exercise its nullification power in cases where
defendants are charged with violating unpopular laws. See id. at 286-97. One example of
this was the difficulty prosecutors encountered obtaining convictions for violating prohi-
bition laws. See id. at 291-93.
93. See Ind. Const. art. I, § 19.
94. See Md. Const. art. 23.
95. Thus, the Indiana provision "does not empower a jury to convict by defining the
elements in an offense in a manner that does violence to the statutory language." Hollo-
way v. State, 352 N.E.2d 523, 529 (Ind. 1976). In Maryland, the jury can only decide the
law when there is a sound dispute as to its interpretation. See Smiley v. State, 294 Md.
461, 466, 450 A.2d 909, 912 (1982). "[T]he jury's right to judge the law is virtually
eliminated; the [Maryland] provision ... basically protects the jury's right to judge the
facts." In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 318, 539 A.2d 664, 682
(1988).
96. See United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1326 (5th Cir. 1983) (Garwood, J.,
concurring); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
97. See Becker, Jury Nullification: Can a Jury Be Trusted?, 16 Trial 41, 43 (Oct.
1980); Scheflin & Van Dyke, supra note 86, at 59; Van Dyke, The Jury as a Political
Institution, 16 Cath. Law. 224, 241 (1970).
98. The district court judge in Coonan doubted the efficacy of this safeguard in RICO
cases because of the unsettled state of the RICO statute and the vague charges that result.
[N]o one knows exactly what [the RICO statute] means, at least the Supreme
Court doesn't, and the circuits don't agree as to what the Supreme Court
thinks, and I have never heard of a RICO case being reversed, and the reason is
the judge always charges vague principles and the Court of Appeals always
finds something in the record to support those vague principles.
See Brief for the United States of America at 6, United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886
(2d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-3007).
99. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a); see, e.g., United States v. Stefan, 784 F.2d 1093, 1100
(I lth Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 855 (1986); United States v. Green, 523 F.2d 229, 231
n.2 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074 (1976). The judge should take a criminal
case from the jury only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could reach a
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Treadwell, 760 F.2d
327, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1064 (1986); United States v. Adamo,
742 F.2d 927, 935 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985).
In civil cases a verdict can be directed for either the plaintiff or the defendant, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 50, but in a criminal case the judge may direct only a verdict of acquittal. See
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73 (1977); Fed. R. Crim. P.
29.
100. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c); see, e.g., United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214,
1247 (11th Cir.), modified in part, 801 F.2d 378 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S.
919 (1987); Morris v. United States, 156 F.2d 525, 531 (9th Cir. 1946). A motion for
judgment of acquittal is only appropriate when no rational jury, viewing the evidence in
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for new trials in the interest of justice.101
Despite these traditional safeguards and the deference traditionally
given criminal jury verdicts, 0 2 courts have deemed it necessary to take
other steps to protect a defendant from the danger of being convicted by
a jury that does not believe every element of a crime has been proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 103 For example, the defendant is entitled to
an instruction on a lesser included offense, even if it is not charged in the
indictment, when conviction of the lesser included offense could be sup-
ported by the evidence and is not totally encompassed by the greater
offense. 104
the light most favorable to the prosecution, could have found the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Wilson, 598 F. Supp. 138, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
United States v. Martorano, 596 F. Supp. 621, 624 (E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd, 767 F.2d 63
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 949 (1985).
101. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 33. A motion based on a claim that the verdict was contrary
to the weight of the evidence should be granted only in exceptional circumstances where
it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow the verdict to stand. See United States v.
Lanier, 838 F.2d 281, 284-85 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Martinez, 763 F.2d 1297,
1313 (11th Cir. 1985).
102. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 399 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
103. When sanity was an element of offenses that the prosecution had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt, courts were concerned that a jury would improperly convict a legally
insane defendant if it thought a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict would result in the
defendant's freedom. See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 422 (5th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Grimes, 421 F.2d 1119, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 932
(1970); Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Bazelon, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 961 (1958). Thus, despite the traditional rule that jurors are
not instructed on issues relating to punishment, see McCracken, 488 F.2d at 423, the
D.C. Circuit instructed jurors that a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict might result
in commitment. See Grimes, 421 F.2d at 1124; Lyles, 254 F.2d at 728. One circuit re-
cently approved this instruction because, in passing the law that made insanity an affirm-
ative defense, Congress endorsed the instruction. See United States v. Neavill, 868 F.2d
1000, 1003-05 (8th Cir.), reh g granted, 877 F.2d 1394 (1989). It must be noted that this
procedure gives the jury more rather than less information than they would ordinarily
receive.
One commentator has suggested that the decision of whether to inform the jury about
the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict be placed in the trial judge's
discretion. See Schwartz, supra note 40, at 176-78.
104. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1965); Berra v. United States,
351 U.S. 131, 134 (1956); Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c).
The rationale behind the lesser included offense charge is that
if the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element
of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury
must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal. But a defendant is
entitled to a lesser offense instruction-in this context or any other-precisely
because he should not be exposed to the substantial risk that the jury's practice
will diverge from theory. Where one of the elements of the offense charged
remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is
likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.
Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212-13 (1973) (emphasis in original); accord
United States ex rel. Moore v. Thieret, No. 86-5099, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 1988)
(WESTLAW, DCT database) ("[tihe lesser-included offense doctrine is premised on the
fear that a jury might convict a defendant of a serious offense, even though it held a
reasonable doubt as to an element of the offense, because the jury could not stomach an
outright acquittal"); see also P. DiPerna, Juries on Trial 195 (1984) (in prosecution of
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In a RICO case, the defendant may face "the substantial risk that the
jury's practice will diverge from theory."' °5 The danger in a RICO case
is that the jury, convinced that the defendant committed one predicate
act, will resolve its doubts on other predicate acts against the defendant
in order to convict and punish him.' 6 The Constitution, however, re-
quires that the prosecutor prove every element of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. °7
Although the Coonan procedure can protect the defendant from this
danger, it can also pose risks to the defendant in other situations. As the
interrogatories must be answered before a general verdict is rendered,
their use may create the danger of leading a jury toward conviction,
which is one of the reasons that special interrogatories are disfavored in
criminal trials. ' 8 There is also a possibility that a jury bent on punishing
the defendant will find all the predicate acts proved, regardless of the
evidence, if the number needed to convict is not disclosed to the jury. 109
The Coonan procedure cannot be justified after considering merely the
defendant's interests and deciding that it is beneficial to the defendant.
The interests of the prosecutor, which are implicated by using the proce-
dure, must be considered as well. If the procedure creates greater
problems than it solves, it should not be used.
B. Prosecution's Perspective
The prosecutor's right to a fair trial must be considered. This right is
protected by procedural rules. For example, the prosecutor is entitled to
jury challenges,10 and severance of defendants or counts if his case will
be prejudiced."' The prosecutor can also submit requests to charge and
Jean Harris, juror claimed that, although jury thought murder charge was too severe, it
felt that defendant should not go free and found her guilty of murder absent other
alternative).
105. Keeble, 412 U.S. at 212.
106. This is especially dangerous when the RICO count is the only charge against the
defendant in the indictment and the prosecution has presented strong proof as to one
particularly heinous predicate act, or other crimes offered to prove the existence of an
illegal enterprise because the jury may not be able to "stomach an outright acquittal."
United States ex rel. Moore v. Thieret, No. 86-5099, slip op. at 4 (N.D. Ill. June 17, 1988)
(WESTLAW, DCT database). On the other hand, when there are other counts in the
indictment, the jury may assume that the defendant will be punished for these acts and be
less concerned with punishment when making its RICO determination.
107. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 842 n. 12 (1 lth Cir.), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 905 (1985). Indeed, instructions that allow the jury to convict without finding the
facts necessary to prove every element cannot be rendered harmless by an appellate
court's determination that the jury could have found all the elements proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Voss, 787 F.2d 393, 398 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 888 (1986).
108. See United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 181 (1st Cir. 1969).
109. See Brief for the United States of America at 29, United States v. Coonan, 839
F.2d 886 (2d Cir. 1988) (No. 88-3007).
110. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 24(b).
111. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.
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raise objections to the court's charge.' 12
The prosecution's right to a fair trial also encompasses the right to
present a cohesive, comprehensive picture of the defendant's behavior to
prove a violation of a criminal statute. The prosecutor, therefore, can
insist on proving an element of a crime, even if the defendant is willing to
stipulate to it." 3 Thus, in a RICO case, the prosecutor can prove the
enterprise element even though it will involve presenting evidence of un-
charged crimes to the jury and the defendant is willing to stipulate to the
enterprise's existence." 4 This prosecutorial interest is also considered
when a defendant requests severance" 5 and has been cited to prevent
bifurcation of the presentation of evidence of elements of a crime. 16
In Coonan, the prosecution thought that use of the special procedure
would impair their ability to present their case as a cohesive unit. One of
the reasons they opposed the Coonan proposal was the fear that the jury
would view the predicate acts as unconnected to the rest of the case.' 17
However, unlike the prejudice that is caused when defendants' trials are
severed,"18 or elements are bifurcated, 1 9 the Coonan procedure does not
prevent the prosecution from presenting all the evidence to the jury in its
proper context. The jury may use the evidence of the predicate acts to
infer the existence of the enterprise. 120 The jury may also use evidence of
the nature of the enterprise to find the relatedness and continuity require-
ments of the pattern element.' 2' Thus, the jury has all the evidence
112. See Fed R. Crim. P. 30.
113. See United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465-66 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 124 (1987); United States v. Gantzer, 810 F.2d 349, 351 (2d Cir. 1987); United States
v. Cutler, 806 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir. 1986). This is subject to Federal Rule of Evidence
403, which allows for the exclusion of relevant evidence if its probative value is substan-
tially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See United States v. Ellison, 793 F.2d 942, 949
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 937 (1986).
114. See Ellison, 793 F.2d at 949.
115. Even if the defendant can show he will be prejudiced by a joint trial, the prejudice
must be substantial enough to outweigh the need for speedy and efficient trials, see United
States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1525-26 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017
(1986), and the interests of the prosecutor whose case may be prejudiced by preventing
him from presenting the case in its entirety to the jury, see United States v. Castellano,
610 F. Supp. 1359, 1410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In addition, the prosecutor's case may be
prejudiced because he may be forced to prove the same charges twice and his witnesses
will be burdened by having to testify repeatedly. Id. This balance is weighed in favor of a
joint trial in "all but the most unusual circumstances." See United States v. Arvanitis,
676 F. Supp. 840, 846 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
116. See United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (Ist Cir. 1989).
117. See United States v. Coonan, 839 F.2d 886, 890 (2d Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Roman, 870 F.2d 65, 76 (2d Cir.) ("jury is entitled to consider the evidence in its
entirety"), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3164 (1989).
118. See supra note 115.
119. See Collamore, 868 F.2d at 28.
120. Some circuits allow the prosecution to use evidence of the predicate acts as part of
the evidence that an enterprise exists. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343,
363 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 65 (1988); United States v. Qaoud, 777 F.2d 1105,
1115 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1098 (1986); United States v. Mazzei, 700
F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
121. See United States v. Indelicato, 865 F.2d 1370, 1383 (2d Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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before it and can make all the permissible inferences during deliberations.
Another potential problem for the prosecution is that it is generally
not considered good trial practice for an attorney to promise something
to the jury in the opening or closing statement that he cannot deliver.1 22
The prosecutor's case may be prejudiced if the jury believes that the ab-
sence of instruction on a pattern of racketeering activity is an indication
that the prosecution has failed to prove that element. On the other hand,
if the prosecutor does not mention a pattern of racketeering activity in
the opening statement, he may lose an opportunity to explain his theory
of the case to the jury. This problem can be remedied by informing the
parties 123 and the jurors that they will be deliberating in two phases.
Other interests of the prosecution are not so easily accommodated.
Traditionally, criminal juries deliberate with knowledge of the effect that
its findings will have on the ultimate verdict and, therefore, do not arrive
at verdicts based on false assumptions.124 This danger to the prosecution
has been recognized in connection with other proposed new procedures
in criminal trials.1 25 The Coonan procedure poses the danger that the
jurors will be more willing to compromise if they do not know the signifi-
cance of the predicate acts as they relate to their verdict on the RICO
count. Thus, when a jury has already determined that a defendant com-
mitted one predicate act, jurors may forego finding other predicate acts
because they think the defendant will be punished anyway.' 26 As a re-
sult, the prosecutor risks losing a conviction he might otherwise have
obtained 27 and has no way of challenging such a verdict.' 28
122. See At Lee, Opening Statement, 27 Air Force L. Rev. 67, 72 (1987); Hughes &
Hsiao, Does the Opening Determine the Verdict?, 22 Trial 66, 68 (Feb. 1986).
123. In civil cases the judge is advised to inform the parties what form the verdict will
take before the closing arguments, so the parties can prepare their arguments accord-
ingly. See Landes Constr. Co. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 833 F.2d 1365, 1374 (9th Cir.
1987).
124. See United States v. McCracken, 488 F.2d 406, 423 (5th Cir. 1974); see also
United States v. Johnson, 469 F.2d 973, 976 n.3 (5th Cir. 1972) (trier of fact not required
to look at evidence in isolation or vacuum).
125. Cf United States v. Collamore, 868 F.2d 24, 28 (Ist Cir. 1989) (jurors might not
understand why possession of weapon was crime if judge bifurcated elements of posses-
sion of weapon by felon and they did not know defendant was felon).
126. See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984); Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347, 383 (1912); United States v. Marques, 600 F.2d 742, 746 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1019 (1979). "Whenever juries seem troubled over a case, they seem to
turn eagerly for a compromise solution." Van Dyke, supra note 97, at 239, see also V.
Hans & N. Vidmar, supra note 23, at 110 (if there are multiple charges against a defend-
ant, minority jurors may be able to get compromise verdict).
127. On' the other hand, when more than two predicate acts are charged, even if the
jury compromises they might still find two predicate acts and a conviction on a RICO
substantive count would be possible.
Procedures such as instructing the jury on a lesser included offense do not pose the
same degree of risk to the prosecutor's case as the procedure proposed in Coonan. If the
jury compromises when it is instructed on a lesser included offense, the prosecutor may
still obtain a conviction. See P. DiPerna, Juries on Trial 182-89 (1984) (discussion of
murder case in which jurors favoring murder conviction and jurors favoring acquittal
compromised on manslaughter conviction).
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The Coonan procedure should be used only in those cases where the
risk to the defendant outweighs this potential prejudice to the prosecu-
tor's case. This is likely to occur when the defendant is charged with one
heinous predicate act for which the prosecution has presented strong
proof and the evidence is too close as to other predicate acts for the judge
to direct a verdict.
CONCLUSION
In some criminal RICO cases, there is a danger that the jury will con-
vict a defendant to punish him even though the prosecution has not
proven the commission of two predicate acts beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Coonan procedure alleviates this danger by helping the jury focus on
each predicate act as it relates to each individual defendant and by ensur-
ing that the jury does not use its nullification power to punish a defend-
ant who it does not believe violated the RICO statute. This process,
however, also creates a danger that a jury will make determinations
based on uninformed speculation. The trial judge is in the best position
to balance the competing interests and dangers which use of this proce-
dure implicates in any particular case. When the risk to the defendant is
greatest, 29 the trial judge should have the discretion to allow the jury to
deliberate in two stages. In the first stage, the jury would render general
verdicts on any counts in the indictment other than RICO and also an-
swer special interrogatories as to any predicate acts not charged in the
indictment. In the second stage, the jury would be instructed on RICO
and render a general verdict on the RICO count.
Robert M. Grass
128. See United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984). For this reason, convictions
on compound offenses do not have to be reversed even when there is an inconsistent
acquittal on an underlying predicate offense. See id. Thus, in a RICO case, if the defend-
ant is convicted on the RICO substantive count but the jury does not find that he com-
mitted at least two predicate acts, the conviction does not automatically have to be
reversed. See United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 559-60 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
109 S. Ct. 493 (1988); United States v. Kragness, 830 F.2d 842, 859 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Tinsley, 800 F.2d 448, 451-52 (4th Cir. 1986).
129. See supra note 106.
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